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RICHARD A. SIMMS*

Equitable ApportionmentPriorities and New Uses
ABSTRACT
The doctrine of equitable apportionment was initially articulated
as a conflict of laws doctrine designed to resolve the over-appropriation of an interstate stream resulting from the accumulation of
rights perfected under differing regimes of water law. The doctrine
also addresses such conflicts between states applying the same doctrine of water law. Historically,an equitable apportionmenthas been
realized by the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation
interstate between prior appropriationstates, varying the doctrine
only to protect economies predicatedon junior appropriations.Recently, the Court appears to have changed the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, suggesting that priority of appropriationmight be
varied to supplant existing uses with new uses of higher economic
value. The new direction in equitable apportionmentmarks a radical
departurefrom settled precedent.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the judicially created doctrine of equitable apportionment
has not been viewed as an intrusion on state prerogatives in the allocation
and administration of water supplies. The doctrine has usually been described as a doctrine "of federal common law that governs disputes
between States concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate
stream," suggesting that its postulates transcend and leave unaffected the
water laws of the competing states.' To some extent, however, each
equitable apportionment case has necessarily impinged on state law.
Until 1963, the judicial application of the doctrine was reasonably
predictable. As noted by Justice Douglas, the Court's decision in Arizona
*After clerking for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Simms became associate counsel with
the New Mexico State Engineer and Interstate Stream Commission in 1972. In 1976, he was made
general counsel and successfully argued United States v. New Mexico, Texas v. New Mexico, and
Colorado v. New Mexico before the United States Supreme Court. After going into private practice
in 1982, Mr. Simms opened his own office in 1988, limiting his practice to water law. He is active
in interstate litigation and currently represents the plaintiff states in Kansas v. Coloradoand Nebraska
v. Wyoming. He is now the senior partner in the firm Simms and Stein. The firm limits its practice
to water law.
1. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
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v. California2 "grant[ed] the federal bureaucracy a power and command
over water rights in the 17 Western States that it never . . . had, that it
always wanted, that it could never persuade Congress to grant, and that
[the] Court up to [then had] consistently refused to recognize." ' Since
1963, the Court has intruded further into water rights perfected under
state law in the name of equitable apportionment. Whether the Court has
done so purposefully or inadvertently is uncertain. It is clear, however,
that recent decisions have broadened the application of the doctrine,
largely by utilizing its traditional precepts out of context. The concept of
balancing benefit and detriment, for example, has been detached from
the futile call doctrine, where it had its origins, and applied as if it were
an economic comparison designed to maximize the value of the resource.
Similarly, traditional notions of conservation and efficiency have taken
on an interstate dimension which seems destined to supplant their customary intrastate implications.
TRADITIONAL STATE PREROGATIVES
Based on a series of cases holding that each state has complete jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams
and other waters, the Court reasoned early on that the right to regulate
and control waters within its territory was the constitutional prerogative
of each state.' As between riparianism and prior appropriation, the Court
held that Congress was powerless to "enforce either rule upon any State. "'
In CaliforniaOregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement Co.,6 Justice
Sutherland was unequivocal:
What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all
non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici
juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states, ...
with the right in each [state] to determine for itself to what extent
the rule of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect to riparian
rights should obtain.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
The doctrine of equitable apportionment was first articulated as a con2. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
3. Id. at628.
4. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
5. Kansas v.Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907).
6. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
7. Id. at 164. The United States argued tothe contrary inthe second equitable apportionment
case, Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922), to no avail. See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 611-16 (1945). Cf. United States v.New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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flict of laws doctrine, a doctrine designed to address the situation in which
differing legal regimes fostered the over-appropriation of an interstate
stream. The classic case is Kansas v. Colorado.' As the water supply
became insufficient to satisfy simultaneous growth in both states, there
appeared a conflict in the social and economic institutions that had developed independently. As sovereigns, each state had adopted substantive
laws under which rights to the use of water might have been perfected,
and each state had exercised those laws historically. The result was a real
conflict between riparian users and users under the doctrine of prior
appropriation, as well as a collision of sovereigns. 9
The problem in Kansas v. Colorado was the development of the Arkansas River in Colorado to the perceptible injury of the downstream
users in Kansas.", The Court found itself faced with a profound practical
problem that arose accidentally from the conflicting exercises of sovereign
power. The issue was whether the Court should overlook slight injury in
Kansas in order to preserve the existing economy in Colorado as well as
the economy in Kansas. In response to a situation where a conflict of
developed interests had forced the issue, the Court declined to grant any
relief to Kansas on the ground that the great benefit to Colorado outweighed the detriment to Kansas." The Court was compelled to balance
benefit against detriment to protect an existing economy predicated on
junior appropriations. To the extent that the Court expressly recognized
injury to riparian users in Kansas, the Court directly encroached on Kansas
water law. It did not, however, purport to change the substance or the
internal administration of Kansas law, and the Court did not elaborate on
the underlying conflict of law problem.
With the exception of one principle that has survived all of the Court's
equitable apportionment cases-that is, that economies predicated on
junior users should be protected to the extent possible-the classic equitable apportionment case turned out to be one of a kind. With the second
case, Wyoming v. Colorado,2 the focus shifted from a conflict of laws
problem to a pure collision of sovereigns. In Wyoming, suit was filed to
prevent a proposed diversion from the Laramie River by two Colorado
corporations. Wyoming asserted that the proposed diversion would not
leave sufficient water to satisfy prior appropriations in Wyoming. Colorado denied the allegation, arguing that it had the right to dispose of the

8. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
9. Id. at 94-95.
10. With characteristic imprecision, the Court termed it "perceptible injury," but found "little,
if any, detriment." id. at 117.
11. Id. at 100-01.
12. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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waters within its borders "regardless of the prejudice that it [might have]
workied]" to Wyoming. 3
Justice Van Devanter concluded that the protectable equities in the two
states were "indissolubly linked with the rights of the appropriators."' 4
The Court reasoned that under the prior appropriation doctrine, the equities are formed by the actual appropriations and the social and economic
dependence which results from them. Accordingly, the Court concluded:
•..[Tihat Colorado's objections to the doctrine of appropriation as
a basis of decision are not well taken, and that it furnishes the only
basis which is consonant with the principles of right and equity
applicable to such a controversy as this is. The cardinal rule of the
doctrine is that priority of appropriation gives superiority of right.
Each of these States applies and enforces this rule in her own territory,
and it is the one to which intending appropriators naturally would
turn for guidance. The principle on which it proceeds is not less
applicable to interstate streams and controversies than to others."5
While the Court apportioned the Laramie by applying the prior appropriation doctrine interstate, there are two areas in which it has been argued
that the Court imposed its own philosophy on Wyoming's law of prior
appropriation. The Court declined to interfere with Wyoming law in a
third area.
First, the Court spent considerable time discussing the quantification
of the flow of the Laramie River, which "varies greatly in the course of
the year and also from year to year." 6 Colorado attempted to inflate the
divertible water supply by using average annual flows. The Court responded by noting that irrigators need "a supply which is fairly constant
and dependable, or is susceptible of being made so by storage and conservation ... .'"" The question was one of practical availability. As a
result, according to one commentator:
The Court's final decree evinced a significant departure from the
doctrine's priority principle. Recognizing the importance of conservation in promoting water's paramount beneficial use, the Court
concluded that the doctrine of equitable apportionment imposed upon
each state a duty to exercise its rights in a manner reasonably calculated to conserve the "common supply." Therefore, in order to
13. Id. at 457.
14. Id. at 468.
15. Id. at 470. The Court also alluded to numerous interstate suits between private appropriators
where priority of appropriation was applied without regard to state lines. See, e.g., Bean v. Morris,
221 U.S. 485 (1911); Conant v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 23 Utah 627, 66 P. 188 (1901); Wiley
v. Decker, II Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903).
16. 259 U.S. at 471.
17. Id. at 480.
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promote conservation of the common supply, the Court granted junior
Colorado appropriators priority over senior Wyoming users for all
years during which the streamflow falls below the judicially-established "fairly constant and dependable" flow. 8

The second arguable impingement on Wyoming law is tied to the first,
namely that the Court required conservation "of the common supply"
beyond that required to eliminate waste or regulate the supply within the
practical, political, and economic means of Wyoming alone. The Court,
however, did not impose a standard of storage or conservation beyond
"practicable limits," and required Wyoming to do nothing it had not
already done on its own."
Finally, Colorado argued, as it did in Colorado v. New Mexico,2" that
it could "accomplish more with the water than Wyoming [could] .... ""
The Court rejected that argument by comparing the uses of water in the

Poudre Valley with the uses on the Laramie Plains. While the argument
was rejected, the Court did not directly foreclose the possibility of limiting
an inefficient use in order to supply water for a comparatively efficient
use-a possibility which, if realized, would indeed impinge on the traditional exercise of state law.22
Two eastern cases, decided in 193 1, represent the Court's first intrusion
on separation of powers and the proposition that Congress was powerless
to enforce either the common law of riparianism or prior appropriation.2 3
In both cases the Court also went a step beyond Professor Clark's observation that equitable apportionment is "a label, not an analysis" by
allowing its reasoning to cross over into hollow rationalization.24 In both
cases, the Court backed into the desired result.
18. Fahmy, Colorado v. New Mexico 11: Judicial Restraint in the Equitable Apportionment of
Interstate Waters, 62 Den. U.L. Rev. 857, 859 (1985) (citations omitted). The fact is that priority
of appropriation was not varied in Wyoming v. Colorado, except to the extent that economically
and practicably feasible storage facilities, which previously had been constructed in Wyoming,
transformed the measure of "available supply" from "the lowest natural flow" to "a constant and
dependable flow," an amount that was far less than the average annual flow. See 259 U.S. 419 at
471-86. To that extent, junior users in Colorado benefited vicariously. The Court expressly stated,
though, that Wyoming was not "required to provide storage facilities in order that Colorado may
obtain a larger amount of water." Id. at 484.
19. 259 U.S. at 480.
20. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
21. 259 U.S. at 468.
22. The issue was next raised in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). Declining to
discriminate between uses on the basis of economic efficiency, the Court refused to reduce Colorado's
uses because the same amount of water might produce more along the lower sections of the North
Platte in Wyoming. Id. at 621.
23. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (193 1); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660
(193 1); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907).
24. R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 132.1 (1967)
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In Connecticut v. Massachusetts, Connecticut sought to enjoin Massachusetts from diverting waters from the watershed of the Connecticut
River to provide water for the City of Boston. Connecticut argued that
the diversion would impair the navigability of the river and its tributaries,
lessen the productivity of bottom lands, diminish the possibility of power
development, reduce the run of shad in the river, and decrease the river's
capacity to discharge sewage. Connecticut also argued that under the
common law of riparianism followed in both states, "each riparian owner
[had] a vested right in the use of the flowing waters and (was] entitled
to have them to flow as they were wont, unimpaired as to quantity and
. . . quality." 2 5 In other words, Connecticut argued that the Court could
not force a change in its substantive laws by allowing transwatershed
diversion in a riparian state. 2 6 To do so would have been to superimpose
an element of prior appropriation on a riparian state.
In denying the injunction and allowing the diversion, the Court found
that there would be no injury to Connecticut interests and that Boston's
dire need for water was more important than doctrinal state law. The
decision, as the Court put it, was based on "the exigencies of the particular
case" instead of "the same rules of law that are applied
in such States
27
for the solution of similar questions of private right."
In New Jersey v. New York, Justice Holmes solved the same problem
by stating that "[tihe different traditions and practices in different parts
of the country may lead to varying results, but the effort always is to
secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas."28
The exigency was the city of New York's need for water, and the formula
that the Court discarded was the state of New York's adoption of the
common law doctrine of riparianism.
In the same year that Connecticut v. Massachusetts and New Jersey v.
New York were decided, the state of Washington sued the state of Oregon
over the Walla Walla River. While referring to both cases concerning the
burden of proof, the basis of decision in Washington v. Oregon" was
quite the opposite from that in Connecticut and New Jersey. Going a step
beyond Wyoming v. Colorado, Washington v. Oregon was decided on

25. 282 U.S. at 669.
26. The Court had previously held that as between prior appropriation states water may be diverted
from one watershed to another because that was part and parcel of the doctrine of prior appropriation.
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922).
27. 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931) (citation omitted).
28. 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931).
29. Notwithstanding the initial decision in New Jersey v. New York, it has been noted that "riparian
principles continue to be the law of the [Delaware Riverl." Tarlock, The Law ofEquitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated and Restated, 56 U.CoLo.L.REv. 381, 397 (1985).
30. 297 US. 517 (1936).
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numerous elements of priority of appropriation without regard to the
stateline.
In 1928, a Washington court adjudicated its priorities intrastate, including an 1892 priority for the Gardena Farms District. In 1912, an
Oregon court adjudicated the priorities of the appropriators on the same
stream in Oregon. All of the priorities interstate were confirmed by the
Court, except the Gardena Farms priority. In analyzing the fate of Gardena
Farms, the Court ignored the stateline in every respect. Noting that a
priority may be lost by abandonment or laches, the Court commented,
on the basis of prior appropriation law, that it would not condone waste
and lack of diligence in perfecting a water right." The Court stated that
"[t]he essence of the doctrine of prior appropriation is beneficial use, not
a stale or barren claim," and concluded that "[ojnly diligence and good
faith will keep the privilege alive." 32 Accordingly, the Court held that
the Oregon appropriators were free not only to assert their priorities
interstate, but also to assert other principles of prior appropriation against
the Washington users. The Gardena Farms right was declared abandoned
for lack of diligence in diverting and applying the water to beneficial use.
The Court also alluded to the detrimental reliance of the Oregon users,
who had been "allowed to develop their little settlement in the faith that
their enjoyment of the waters was uncontested by any one.133
The most complicated equitable apportionment case was Nebraska v.
Wyoming, involving the waters of the North Platte River. 4 Nebraska
charged that Wyoming and Colorado were violating the rule of priority
of appropriation adopted by the three states, thus depriving Nebraska of
water to which it was entitled. The facts reflected an uneven development
of the economies dependent on the river in the three states. In effecting
an apportionment, the Court organized the river into six sections corresponding to six naturally defined reaches of the river basin. This procedure
enabled the Court to specifically apportion water along the various reaches
in order to preserve the development in each section.
While the common predictable objective of each of the previous equitable apportionment cases was to protect existing economies, the hold31.

Id. at 527.
32. Id (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 528. Additionally, the Court balanced benefit and detriment without using that terminology. Sticking to the vernacular of the futile call doctrine, the Court noted that the channel losses
were such that it would have made little sense for Oregon to bypass the water when the amount of
water that would have reached Washington would have produced little benefit.
34. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). Originally docketed as Original Nos. 5, 6, & 16, Nebraska v. Wyoming
was reopened pursuant to the Court's retention of jurisdiction on January 20, 1987, following
Nebraska's Motion for Leave to File Petition for an Order Enforcing Decree and For Injunctive
Relief. The case has been renumbered Original No. 108.
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ing in Nebraska is the clearest example of that objective. Because of the
complexity of diversions in the three states along six reaches of the river,
protection of the existing economies could not have been accomplished
through the strict application of priorities. Priority of appropriation remained the guiding principle, but it was varied to protect established
economies based on junior appropriations:
. [[If
[h. an allocation between appropriation States is to be just and
equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be possible.
For example, the economy of a region may have been established
on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible those established uses should be protected though strict application of the priority
rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for the exercise of
an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority
of appropriation is the guiding principle. "
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, as in the previous cases, the Court recognized
that as between appropriation states priority of appropriation would effectuate the most equitable apportionment. In Nebraska, where a strict
application of priority was varied for the first time, the attempt was made
to treat the various segments of the river by priorities.36 Where the Court
was able to apply priorities, it did so. Priority was strictly applied between
Wyoming and Nebraska. 7 When alternative methods were adopted for
various segments, the methods were scrutinized with respect to priority.
In the Whalen to Tri-State Dam segment, for example, Justice Douglas
noted that "the alternative method [had] much to recommend it because
of its rather strict adherence to the principle of priority during the periods
of low flow." 3 In short, the Court never wavered in its understanding
that priority should control unless its application would undermine existing economies. Accordingly, with the exception of the two cases involving exigent municipal needs, the Court was careful to respect state
regimes of water law and the fact that Congress was powerless to impose
one system or another on a state."
While the Court's promulgation of the novel concept of congressional
apportionment in Arizona v. California" was probably the single greatest
intrusion into state prerogatives in the regulation and disposition of western waters, the case did promote the use of the principles of prior appropriation in making an equitable apportionment.
35, Id. at 618.
36. Id. at 628-46.

37. Id. at 627.
38. Id. at 644.
39. Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907).
40. 373 U.S. 546.
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In the opinion, the Court distinguished between the law applicable to
the mainstem Colorado and that applicable to its tributaries. The Court
held that the mainstem was controlled by the Boulder Canyon Project
Act." Traditional principles of equitable apportionment applied to one
tributary, the Gila River. The Court said:
Arizona and New Mexico presented the Master with conflicting claims
to water in the Gila River, the tributary that rises in New Mexico
and flows through Arizona. Having determined that tributaries are
not within the regulatory provisions of the Project Act the Master
held that this interstate dispute should be decided under the principles
of equitable apportionment. After hearing evidence on this issue, the
Master accepted a compromise settlement agreed upon by these States
and incorporated that settlement in his findings and conclusions, and
in Part IV (A) (B) (C) (D) of his recommended decree.4'
In Arizona v. California,43 New Mexico had argued that the doctrine
of prior appropriation should be varied as applied to the Gila River so
that New Mexico's junior uses could be protected. The Special Master
recommended that:
New Mexico seeks a confirmation of existing uses in that state from
the Gila River System. Despite the fact that many of these uses are
junior in time to uses downstream in Arizona, I conclude that they
should not be disturbed.
Although priority of appropriation has been characterized as the
guiding principle of equitable apportionment in the ard regions of
the United States, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wy-

oming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922), it is by no means necessarily conclusive of the rights in dispute. In Nebraska v. Wyoming,
supra, at 618, the Court said:
"Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and
climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several
sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent
of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to the downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They
are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate
the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be made."

41. id. at 564-65 (citing 45 Stat. 1057, 43 U.S.C. §§617-617t (1928)).
42. 373 U.S. at 594-95.
43. 373 U.S. 546.
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It is worthy of note that the Court, in an equitable apportionment suit,
has never reduced junior upstream existing uses by rigid application of
priority of appropriation. Indeed, the tendency has been to protect existing
uses wherever possible. See Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907)."
The Master and the Court adhered to precedent in another important
respect:
New Mexico also claims the right to water for future requirements.
It is here, however, that priority of appropriation has its greatest
effect. It would be unreasonablein the extreme to reserve water for
future use in New Mexico when senior downstream appropriators in

Arizona remain unsatisfied. It was so held as to Colorado's claim in
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 4
The Court had previously stated that it would not determine the rights
of a state to waters "which have not yet been and which may never be
appropriated"
because it was not in the business of issuing "declaratory
46
decrees"
THE NEW DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
In all of the equitable apportionment cases before 1963, the Supreme
Court discussed fundamental fairness, equity, and flexibility in the application of the doctrine. In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court considered
"the effect of what [had] been done upon the conditions in the respective
states. . .[to] adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of rights. ....
"'
In Wyoming v. Colorado, the Court was interested in "a basis of decision
. ..consonant with the principles of right and equity . . . ."
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court stated that "[a]pportionment calls for the
exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors." 49
Each of these cases has a common thread-the protection of existing
economies to the extent possible. When that could not be done between
appropriation states by a strict application of priorities, the Court described the doctrine of equitable apportionment as ad hoc, a "flexible"
doctrine designed to secure a "just and equitable" allocation." The Court's
interest in equity on a case-by-case basis was such that it refused to
'quibble over formulas.' S
44.
45,
46.
47.
48,
49.
50.
51.

Special Master Report at 325-27 (Dec. 5,1960), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
id. at 331 (emphasis added).
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 464 (1931).
206 U.S. at 100.
259 U.S. at 470.
325 U.S. at 618,
Id.
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931).
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Until Justice Marshall's decision in Coloradov. New Mexico,52 (Colorado 1), the "flexibility" the Court had woven into its previous decisions
was designed to protect existing economies predicated on junior uses in
situations where priorities could not be strictly applied interstate to accomplish the same goal. Justice Marshall, however, used the same hyperbolic expressions of equity and judicial latitude to reach the opposite
result, that is, to upset an existing economy in order to make water
available for a future use. Colorado I marks a radical departure from
precedent in the federal common law, as well as the Court's second major
intrusion into established state law.
After discussing the flexibility of the doctrine of prior appropriation
and the Court's refusal to quibble over formulas, Justice Marshall stated
in ColoradoI that:
In reaching his recommendation the Special Master did not focus
exclusively on the rule of priority, but considered other factors such
as the efficiency of current uses in New Mexico and the balance of
benefits to Colorado and harm to New Mexico. New Mexico contends
that it is improper to consider these other factors." It maintains that
this Court has strictly applied the rule of priority when apportioning
water between States adhering to the prior appropriation doctrine,
and has departed from that rule only to protect an existing economy
built upon junior appropriations. Since there is no existing economy
in Colorado dependent upon the use of water from the Vermejo River,
New Mexico contends that the rule of priority is controlling. We
disagree with this inflexible interpretation of the doctrine of equitable
apportionment.
Our prior cases clearly establish that equitable apportionment will
protect only those rights to water that are "reasonably required and
applied." ' Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922). Especially in those Western States where water is scarce, "[tihere must
be no waste ...of the 'treasure' of a river.... Only diligence and
good faith will keep the privilege alive." Washington v. Oregon, 297
U.S. 517, 527 (1936)." Thus, wasteful or inefficient uses will not
be protected. See ibid.; Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, 325 U.S., at
618. Similarly, concededly senior water fights will be deemed forfeited or substantially diminished where the rights have not been
exercised or asserted with reasonable diligence. Washington v. Ore52. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
53. The statement is incorrect. New Mexico contended that consideration of all of "these other
factors" compelled the application of priority of appropriation.
54. The Court did not recognize that beneficial use as the measure of a right and diligence in
application are principles of prior appropriation.
55. The Court failed to recognize that the language quoted related to the application not only of
priorities interstate, but of yet another fundamental element of prior appropriation, namely the concept
of diligence in application to beneficial use.
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gon, supra, 297 U.S., at 527-528; Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S.
383, 394 (1943).56

The decision in Colorado I injected two unprecedented elements into
equitable apportionment, each of which may directly impinge on the
substantive laws of the western states. First, the Court concluded that "it
is entirely appropriate to consider the extent to which reasonable conservation measures by New Mexico might offset the proposed Colorado
diversion and thereby minimize any injury to New Mexico users." 57
Secondly, the Court stated, completely out of context, that "we have held
that in an equitable apportionment of interstate waters it is proper to
weigh the harms and benefits to competing states."" Justice Marshall
concluded that "[tihis approach comports with our emphasis on flexibility
in equitable apportionment. . . .""
The issue of conservation arose from the alleged inefficiency of the
Vermejo Conservancy District in New Mexico. While the proof showed
that the District fell in the middle range of reclamation projects in terms
of efficiency, Colorado argued and the Master adopted the position that
the District could, in some unspecified way, improve its efficiency.' The
Master also concluded that "there is little doubt that the District has failed
as a water reclamation project and has serious financial and operation
problems .... "6
Because the Court in Colorado I concluded that the Master's report
was unsupported by evidence in the record, the Court remanded the case
for specific findings in five areas. The remand produced Colorado 11 to:
1) "[Aissess whether Vermejo River water could reasonably be made
available for diversion;" and 2) "[Bjalanc[e benefit and harm from diversion .... ,62 In Colorado 1, the Court seemed to clearly adopt the
views that: 1) If conservation by New Mexico could augment the supply,
Colorado could be awarded the water conserved for its proposed use, and
2) that from a purely economic point of view the Court would balance
benefit and detriment and would be willing to sacrifice a comparatively
inefficient use for an idealized future use.
It is not clear whether the Court understood the conceptual problems
with the two elements it injected into equitable apportionment.63 The
56. 459 U.S. at 184 (footnotes inserted).
57. Id. at 186.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 188.
60. Tr. 239-44, 503-04, Special Master Report at 20 (May 31, 1983). Colorado 1.
61. Special Master Report at 20, Colorado 1.
62. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 314 (1984) [hereinafter Colorado II].
63. While Justices O'Connor and Powell warned the majority of the practical problems inherent
in its decision in Colorado I, Colorado II was decided on Colorado's failure to meet its burden of
proof. At the same time, Colorado II is a clear retreat from Colorado 1, and the extent to which the
brave new world of equitable apportionment is still the Court's position is unclear.
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Court recognized in Colorado I that conservation is a factor that might
make water available for a new junior appropriation. Although it may be
buried between the lines in Justice O'Connor's decision in Colorado HI,
the Court failed to recognize that this factor had nothing to do with
restructuring priorities interstate. In the circumstance presented in the
dispute, that is, a proposed new use on an admittedly fully appropriated
river, there is no justification in law, logic, or equity for awarding an
apportionment on the basis of an augmented water supply and simultaneously awarding the first priority to the new use.' Whether the Court
will do so in the future is anybody's guess.
The balance of benefit and detriment recommended by the Master and
seemingly adopted by the Court in Colorado I is the most egregious
intrusion thus far into water rights perfected under state law and the
economies predicated thereon. It is also the most egregious departure
from precedent in equitable apportionment law.
Largely because a balancing of existing equities against the speculation
and idealization that accompanies a proposed future use is difficult at
best, the Court never thought of doing so before Colorado I. On the
contrary, the Court had directly repudiated the idea.6 Judge Rifkind
thought the idea "would be unreasonable in the extreme," a position the
Court agreed with in 1963.'
The Court was able to reach its opinion in Colorado I by approaching
the balancing of benefit and detriment out of context. In Colorado 1, the
majority referred to Nebraska v. Wyoming, 67 in which an apportionment
of the North Platte River was effected on behalf of an existing economy
in Colorado based upon junior appropriations. The Court noted in that
case that the rule of priority should not be strictly applied where it "would
work more hardship" on the junior users "than it would bestow benefits"
on the senior users.68 The facts, however, reveal a fundamental difference
in circumstances which shielded the Court from the conjecture inherent
in balancing existing equities against a future use. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the balancing of benefit against injury was undertaken only when
it was shown that the water involved would benefit the junior use but not
the senior use. The Court said:
If a canal in North Park [Colorado] were closed to relieve the shortage
of a senior appropriator in Nebraska, it would be highly speculative
whether the water would reach the Nebraska appropriator in time or
64. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming. 325 U.S. 589 (1945);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
65. See cases cited supra at n.64.
66. Special Master Report at 331 (Dec. 5, 1960), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
67. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
68. Id. at 619.
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whether the closing of the Colorado canal would work more hardship
there than it would bestow benefits in Nebraska. 9
In other words, the balancing of benefit and hardship was a balancing
between the complete loss of water to the junior appropriators in Colorado
and the likelihood that the benefits arising from the alternative use by the
senior downstream users in Nebraska would not have been realized to
any significant extent because the water would not have arrived in time
or in sufficient quantity to have been of benefit. The principle articulated
in the balancing of benefit and hardship in Nebraska v. Wyoming was not
a judgmental balancing of the economic value of Nebraska's use with
Colorado's, but rather the principle which underlies a futile priority call.
That same principle was not present in Colorado L70
In part the balancing principle introduced in Colorado I was based
upon the Court's recognition that it is proper to weigh "the harms and
benefits to competing states," as was done in Kansas v. Colorado.7 There,
the Court said: "[W]e declined to grant any relief to Kansas on the grounds
that the great benefit to Colorado outweighed the detriment to Kansas." 7"
The principle discussed in Kansas v. Colorado, however, like the principle
in Nebraska v. Wyoming, was not applicable in Colorado v. New Mexico.
The Kansas Court was not balancing speculative economic value with
existing economic value in order to weigh the possibility of displacing
the latter because the new use was "better." On the contrary, the Court
was there addressing a practical problem that arose from conflicting exercises of sovereign power. As noted above, the issue was whether the
Court should condone slight injury in Kansas in order to save two existing
economies, and not whether the Court could allow a new use in Colorado
to the detriment of existing uses in Kansas. In Colorado v. New Mexico,
a conflict of developed interests had not forced the issue. Instead, the
Court manufactured the problem which it had previously used the balancing test to resolve.
CONCLUSION
In Colorado II, Justice O'Connor initially noted that, while "the equities presumptively [support] protection of . . . established senior uses,
.. . other factors-such as waste, availability of reasonable conservation
69. Id.
70. Similarly, the facts in Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936), did not result in a
judgmental balancing of comparative economic value, but rather the Court's determination that
"[during the period of water shortage, only a small quantity of water would go by if the dams
should be removed," Id. at 522-23.
71. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
72. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 186.
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measures, and the balance of benefit and harm from diversion-could be
considered in the apportionment calculus." 7 She also pointed out that
"the Court explained in detail the law of equitable apportionment" in
Colorado L74 The lingering question is whether the Court tacitly backed
away from its departure from precedent in Colorado I or whether it truly
intended to graft new ideas of conservation, efficiency, and economic
balancing onto the doctrine of equitable apportionment and the law of
prior appropriation.
The decision in Colorado H was unquestionably correct. Colorado
identified no conservation measures, no specific means of improving
efficiency, and no way in which New Mexico might have reduced its
diversion requirements. Colorado also failed to specify the exact nature
of its proposed future uses and to explain the benefits that would be
derived therefrom. In short, Colorado produced no clear and convincing
evidence.7"
Nevertheless, in Colorado 11 Justice O'Connor noted the Court's continuing belief "that the flexible doctrine of equitable apportionment extends to a State's claim to divert previously appropriated water for future
uses.76 The Court also noted that an apportionment for a new use on a
fully appropriated river could result from "clear evidence that a project
is far less efficient than. . . other projects." 77 Consequently, the combined
opinions seem to indicate a new direction in equitable apportionment, a
direction that will necessarily undermine expectations long settled under
state law. While the Court's effort to maximize the value of the resource
may be well-intentioned, its effort to do so has added a hidden Darwinian
quality to equitable apportionment.

73. 467 U.S. at 313-14.
74. Id. at 315.
75. Id. at 312; see also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1944); Washington v. Oregon,
297 U.S. 517 (1936); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 672 (1931); New Jersey v. New
York, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); and Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 105-06 (1907).
76. 467 U.S. at 323.
77. Id. at 320.

